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Abstract – We investigate asymmetric volatility effect (the negative partial correlation 
between volatility and lagged return), conditioning volatility changes to the sign of 
cumulative return over the past ten days. We find that negative cumulative past returns 
are fundamental to understand asymmetric volatility. However we also find that 
asymmetric volatility can not be interpreted as simply a response to cumulative returns 
instead of last return. We explain the role of past cumulative return based on the 
behavioral bias labeled “disposition effect” by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Using a 
measure of average capital gain instead of cumulative return, to proxy for intensity of 
disposition effect, as proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005), we confirm our conjecture 
that for negative capital gain volatility is more sensitive to return shocks. But we also 
find, consistently with our argument, that for positive capital gain volatility is less 
sensitive to return shocks. 
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Resumo – Nós investigamos a o efeito de volatilidade assimétrica (a correlação parcial 
negativa entre volatilidade e retorno no período anterior), condicionando variações da 
volatilidade ao sinal do retorno acumulado nos últimos dez dias. Encontramos que 
retornos acumulados negativos são fundamentais para compreender a volatilidade 
assimétrica. Entretanto, também verificamos que a volatilidade assimétrica não pode ser 
interpretada como simplesmente uma resposta a retornos acumulados ao invés do último 
retorno. Explicamos o papel do retorno acumulado nos baseando no viés 
comportamental denominado “efeito disposição” por Shefrin e Statman (1985). Usando 
uma medida ponderada de ganho de capital no lugar de retorno acumulado, como 
aproximação da intensidade do efeito disposição, conforme proposto por Grinblatt e 
Han (2005), confirmamos nossa conjectura de que para ganho de capital negativo a 
volatilidade é mais sensível a choques de retorno. Adicionalmente encontramos, 
consistentemente com nossa argumentação, que para ganho de capital positivo a 
volatilidade é menos sensível a choques de retorno. 
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It is well documented in finance literature that the standard deviation of returns 
for a stock (from now on, volatility of the stock) changes over time and presents 
clustering (that is, after abnormally high absolute returns, other abnormally high 
absolute returns are more probable). Another stylized fact is the asymmetric volatility, 
which is a negative partial correlation between volatility and lagged returns. 
Nevertheless, the subjacent economic factors that determine these stylized facts are not 
well known yet. The focus of the present study is on these subjacent economic factors. 
 
The clustering behavior of volatility has been successfully reflected within the 
Auto-regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model developed by Engle 
(1982). This model was generalized by Bollerslev (1986), allowing volatility to respond 
not only to abnormal past absolute returns, but also to past volatility, in the General 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH).
1 Modifications of the 
GARCH model also capture asymmetric volatility effect. But these models assume 
changing, clustering and asymmetric volatility, shedding no light on the subjacent 
processes. 
 
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a) (henceforth ACG) provided empirical 
evidence that the combination of signs of current return and cumulative past returns 
over a few days plays a role in conditional volatility. They explained their result based 
on behavioral biases. However their study was focused on the contribution to 
asymmetric volatility of sell trades, that is, trades initiated by a sell offer. So, all their 
results are conditioned on the fraction of sell trades over total trades. This motivated us 
to study the effect of these combinations of signs on asymmetric volatility 
independently of volume data. Our results diverge from ACG. While for ACG volatility 
increases more when cumulative past return is positive and current return is negative, 
for us volatility increases more when cumulative negative return and current return are 
negative. Our results also reject that asymmetric volatility is associated only with 
cumulative past returns. 
 
As ACG we rely on “disposition effect” to explain the results. The disposition 
effect, labeled by Shefrin and Statman (1985), is the tendency of investors to hold 
stocks with negative cumulative returns (“losers”) for too long and sell stocks with 
positive cumulative returns (“winners”) too early. Taking past cumulative returns is a 
way to classify winners and losers. For losers, investors subject to disposition effect 
(henceforth DE investors) hold their stocks, resulting in illiquidity for the stock, mainly 
for negative current returns. If demand shocks cause price changes as in Campbell, 
Grossman and Wang (1993), then these price changes will be more intense due to 
illiquidity. 
 
We may analogously reason that for winner stocks, DE investors are willing to 
sell their shares, making the market more liquid for the stock. Then volatility should 
                                                 
1 As emphasized by Enders (2004): “The benefits of the GARCH model should be clear; a high-order 
ARCH model may have a more parsimonious GARCH representation that is much easier to identify and 
estimate.” increase less in the presence of demand shocks. Our results, however, do not support 
this part of the reasoning. We attribute this to the limited ability of returns over 10 days 
to classify winners and losers from the perspective of DE investors. We then propose 
the use of a measure of capital gain based on a longer sequence of past data, similar to 
the one proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005) on a study about the relation between 
disposition effect and momentum.
2 When we combine the signs of current return and 
capital gain, we indeed show that volatility responds more intensively to shocks when 
capital gain and current return are both negative, and responds less intensively when 
both are positive. 
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section data used in the 
analyses is described. In section 3 we present the results on how the combination of 
signs of current returns and cumulative returns over past ten days affects asymmetric 
volatility. In section 4 we develop our explanation based on disposition effect and show 
that using capital gain instead of cumulative returns over ten days, our explanation is 






We use the daily returns, shares outstanding and trading volumes from CRSP 
database covering NYSE stocks over the sample period from January of 1987 through 
December of 1998. Data from 1987 is only used to estimate reference prices in a way 
similar to Grinblatt and Han (2005)
3. Our sample comprises only common stocks listed 
at NYSE with data available for every trading day in the selected period. Thus, all 
stocks in the sample are listed at NYSE for at least one year, and have survived for a 
period of 11 years. This sample is convenient because it excludes the crash of October 
of 1987,
 4 and the core of the burst and blow of the NASDAQ bubble. It also removes 
firms that have gone through recent IPO, that have been delisted in the period, and that 
are very illiquid. This enhances the focus on idiosyncratic volatility driven by 
exogenous demand shocks. The final sample comprehends 844 stocks. 
 
We classified each observation (that is, each stock – date), by size, within the 
cross-section of each date. Stocks were classified into five equal sized groups
5. The 
proxy for size was market capitalization computed as the product of share price by the 
                                                 
2 Momentum is the positive correlation of cumulative returns measured over periods of three to twelve 
months. It was first reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
 
3 The sample period, then, goes from January of 1988 through December of 1998. This is the same period 
used by Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a). 
 
4 Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993), analyzing the reversal of returns due to liquidity trading, which 
is the source of volatility we are interested in, noticed that their analysis, with a sample period from 1962 
through 1988, was “dominated by a  few observations  around  the  stock  market  crash  of October  19,  
1987”. For this reason they removed from their sample all the data starting from October 1
st, 1987. Since 
they mention “a few observations around” the crash, we think it is satisfactory to start our sample in the 
beginning of 1988. 
 
5 The group with smaller firms had fewer observations, since 844 is not a multiple of 5. number of shares outstanding on that date.
6 Summary statistics for each size group are 
presented in Table I. Except for the number of stocks (which is fixed, despite the stocks 
in each group may change), values presented in Table I are mean values for respective 
variable, with standard deviation in parenthesis, calculated with all observations (stock 
– dates).
7 The values of turnover are daily turnover multiplied by 255, to get an 
approximate value of the corresponding yearly turnover. Market Capitalization is in 
billions of dollars. Realized volatility is calculated for each observation (stock – date) 
using the 255 past returns. Because realized volatility and market capitalization are very 
persistent at daily frequency, we omit standard deviations. 
 
 
Table I – Summary statistics by size group 
  1 (small)  2  3  4  5 (big) 
no. stocks  168  169  169  169  169 





















volatility  2.693%  1.945%  1.808%  1.710%  1.618% 

















Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a), henceforth ACG, find evidence that 
dummies defined by combining the signs of current daily return and cumulative returns 
over the past ten days are relevant for conditional volatility. Since there are four 
combinations of the signs of these two variables (we will refer to each combination as a 
regime), they defined four dummies. They argue that due to behavioral biases, market 
dynamics is different for each regime. For instance, ACG argued that the regime 
characterized by positive unexpected current daily return and negative cumulative return 
over the past ten days is dominated by contrarian trading of informed investors. As their 
study was about “the impact of trades on daily volatility”, they evaluated how these 
dummies affected the relation between conditional volatility and measures of daily 
trading. (They focused on the ratio of sell trades over total trades.)  
 
This raises the question whether the same dummies (or the same definition of 
regimes) affect conditional volatility independently of trading volume measures. We are 
                                                 
6 This is not the best alternative from the econometric point of view, because size classification will be 
correlated with past cumulative return. We should use, for instance, the market capitalization at the end of 
previous year. We chose this way because it was easier and faster to compute. We don not believe that 
any significant bias was introduced, also because results were similar for the five groups. 
 
7 Because stocks are classified by group every day, it does not make sense to calculate de mean for each 
variable and then the mean of the variables in the size group. especially interested on how asymmetric volatility (the negative auto-correlation 
between volatility and lagged returns)
 8 is affected by cumulative past returns. One 
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where j indexes stocks, t indexes trading days, rt is the unexpected return, σ 
p
j,t is the 
conditional volatility, vj,t is an error term, I
*
j,t is a dummy, that equals 1 if rt is negative, 
and equals zero otherwise,  and α, θ0, θ1, and φi are parameters to be estimated. This 
specification is similar to the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model developed by Bollerslev (1986). The main 
difference is the inclusion of a dummy to account for asymmetry in the partial 
correlation between past returns and volatility.
9 The existence of asymmetric volatility 
effect is characterized by a statistically significant negative parameter θ1.
  
 
We expand equation (1) to include the different dummies defined similarly to 
ACG. Also, to avoid the use of a large set of lags of our proxy for volatility, we follow 
Corsi (2009) and use a cascade model. We build the cascade model with two past 
realized volatilities computed at periods of 22 trading days (approximately 1 month), 
and 128 trading days (approximately 1 semester). Thus, we will estimate volatility as: 
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where θ1, θ2 and θ3 are additional parameters to be estimated, and RV
D
j,t is the realized 
volatility of the D days starting at t – D + 1 . The variables I
 ss
j,t are dummies defined as 
follows: I
 nn
j,t = 1 if past cumulative return and current return are negative; I
 pn
j,t = 1 if 
past cumulative return is positive and current return is negative, and I
 pp
j,t = 1 if past 
cumulative return and current return are positive. As ACG past cumulative returns are 
calculated for the ten previous days.
10 
 
In essence, our null hypothesis is that the series of daily returns is a martingale, 
and volatility is an auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) process. This means that 
we may use simple returns directly as unexpected returns. There is a whole literature on 
the predictability of stock-returns, the so called “anomalies” to the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis. Schwert (2003) presents a review of this literature. This challenges our 
choice of using returns directly as unexpected returns. Additionally, mean returns 
should pay a premium for risk that should be greater than the risk free rate. Then, 
unexpected returns should at least discount this premium. However there is no 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Nelson (1991) for empirical evidence of asymmetric volatility in daily returns of the 
value weighed CRSP index. Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a) provide empirical evidence of 
asymmetric volatility in daily returns for individual stocks. 
 
9 This specification is also referred to as threshold-GARCH, or TARCH. 
 
10 Instead of four dummies, we use only three in equation (3), to avoid linear dependence. ACG used the 
four regime dummies because the dummies multiplied their sells trade measure, avoiding linear 
dependence. agreement in finance literature about the best procedure to estimate the risk premium, at 
least because it is not clear whether there is risk associated to the excess returns of 
anomalies.
11 On the other hand, supporting our approach, there is empirical evidence 
that the unconditional auto-correlation of individual stock returns is “both statistically 
and economically insignificant” (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988), and if they are statistically 
significant as for French and Roll (1986), then, “since the average autocorrelations are 
small in magnitude, it is hard to gauge their economic significance”.
12 Indeed, mean 
expected return is much lower than the standard deviation of daily returns, as we see in 
Table I. We are actually interested in changes of the standard deviation of stock returns, 
or the volatility. For this reason, trying to adjust returns for possible violations of the 
martingale hypothesis may add noise that will distort the measure we are interested in. 
 
The absolute value of unexpected return has been used as a proxy for daily 
volatility at least since Schwert (1990), and has also been used by ACG. The use of a 
direct measure of volatility allows pooling data in our analyses. Because we are 
interested in performing analyses in the cross-section of stocks, pooled data analyses are 
preferable. The alternative would be individual time-series analysis of each stock, using 
a modified GARCH model. But this way we would obtain individual parameters for 
each stock and would not be able to make inference about the mean parameter, because 
the time-series are not independent.
13 To keep consistency, we calculate realized 
volatility as the mean of absolute returns, instead of the mean of the squares of 
demeaned returns. 
 
With the considerations above, we arrive at the following equation, for which we 
will estimate the parameters: 
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Table II presents the estimated parameters in equation (3). In parenthesis are t 
statistics using standard errors robust to heteorskedasticity. The coefficient θ1 is highly 
statistically significant for all size groups. The coefficient θ2, when statistically 
significant, is negative. This means that cumulative past returns plays a major role in 
asymmetric volatility. One might argue that asymmetric volatility is actually related to 
past returns. However, if this was the case, coefficient θ3 should be unambiguously 
                                                 
11 In the words of Schwert (2003) “They [the anomalies] indicate either market inefficiency (profit 
opportunities) or inadequacy in the underlying asset-pricing model.” 
 
12 This explains why we do not estimate unexpected returns as the residuals of an auto-correlation process 
with many lags of returns, as Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a). Indeed they allege to be following 
Schwert (1990), but this author was working with an aggregate market index (the CRSP value weighed 
index), for which auto-correlations are statistically and economically significant. 
 
13 A better direct measure of daily volatility is the realized daily volatility calculated from intra-day 
returns series, as proposed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). But working with a large set of stocks and 
a time span of many years makes this sort of analysis virtually unviable, mainly if we want to expand the 
analysis backward in time. negative. The question raised is: why negative cumulative past returns increases the 




Table II –   Estimated parameters of equation (3). 
 



















































































4. An Explanation 
 
Under no-arbitrage hypothesis, the variance of returns is directly related to 
information flow (Ross, 1989). However, empirical evidence points in the opposite 
direction, that is, most of volatility is not related to information flow. French and Roll 
(1986) and Roll (1988) present some evidence that public news plays a minor role in 
price changes. Shiller (1981) and West (1988) show that prices volatility in the stock 
market are much greater than the ex-post volatility of fundamental value calculated with 
the discount value of dividends. Prices changes not based on public information arise to 
accommodate trading initiated by private motivation, which we will call demand 
shocks.
 15 Although it seems that other investors could arbitrage on these prices 
deviations, market frictions constrain arbitrage strategies. For instance, if there are 
investors with private information, there is a problem of adverse selection that limits 
                                                 
14 The explanation by Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a) for the differences in volatility behavior for 
different regimes does not apply. First because it is conditioned on the fraction of sell trades. Second 
because they find higher response to current negative returns when past returns are positive. 
 
15 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) simply assume the supply of the stock is random. This is compatible with 
a fixed supply of the stock and some investors with a random demand. Kyle (1985) labels these investors 
with random demand as “noise traders”. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume that some investors may be 
subject to stochastic shocks in their preferences. Wang (1994) works with incomplete markets and 
asymmetric information. In his framework demand shocks may arise either based on private information 
or for hedge motives after idiosyncratic shocks in private investment opportunities. 
 arbitrage strategies against demand shocks.
16 Another approach is that there are 
investors who are misinformed about fundamental value of the stock. Arbitrage may be 
limited due to limited funding or short horizon of arbitrageurs, since they do not know 
for how long they must bear their bet against these misinformed noise traders, who may 
even increase their bets.
17  
 
If price changes are not related to news, but to demand shocks, then they tend to 
be reversed, as shown by Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993).
18 One may expect that 
if the market for a stock is very liquid, demand shocks are easily accommodated, and 
associated contemporaneous price changes will be small as well as subsequent reversals. 
Conversely, when market is illiquid, the magnitude of contemporaneous price changes 
and related reversals should be greater. This relation between demand shocks, illiquidity 
and reversals has been shown by Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006b). So, conditional 
volatility (the standard deviation of relative price changes, i.e. returns), is expected to be 
positively correlated with illiquidity. Additionally, the response of conditional volatility 
to lagged returns tends to be higher. So, returning to the question raised in the end of 
Section 3, if past returns affect illiquidity, they do affect the intensity of volatility’s 
response to lagged returns. Specifically, we are able to answer why negative cumulative 
past returns increases the impact of negative current returns if we identify the reason 
why illiquidity should be higher after negative cumulative returns.
 19 
 
Since the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there has been a 
growing literature on how agents may be influenced in their decisions by behavioral 
biases. The “disposition effect”, labeled by Shefrin and Statman (1985), is a behavioral 
bias characterized by the tendency of investors to hold stocks with negative cumulative 
returns (“losers”) for too long and sell stocks with positive cumulative returns 
(“winners”) too early.
20 Odean (1988) provides empirical evidence that many individual 
                                                 
16 This is the approach used by the authors mentioned in the previous foot note. 
  
17 This approach is represented by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Wadmann (1990), and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997).  
 
18 Here we mention “news”, generically, instead of “public news”, because a private motivation to trend 
may be private information. In this case price changes are not expected to reverse, as shown by Llorente, 
Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002). 
 
19 We will again justify our preference for returns in equation (3), instead of unexpected returns taken as 
the residuals of an auto-correlation process. Volatility is generally defined as the standard deviation of 
returns, as pointed by Poon and Granger (2003), in a review of volatility forecasting in financial markets. 
We are arguing that time changes in this variable are due to changes in expected return associated with 
liquidity trading. If we remove the auto-correlated component of returns, the signal we want to capture is 
attenuated. The use of unexpected returns computed as the residuals of an auto-regressive process is best 
fitted to test the intertemporal relation between expected return and risk (standard deviation from 
expected returns). 
 
20 It combines two behavioral biases: loss aversion, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and 
“mental accounting”, proposed by Thaler (1980). Loss aversion is the reluctance to take decisions that 
represent sure losses, from the perspective agents frame the problem. Mental accounting is the tendency 
to evaluate risky decisions independently, i.e., creating a mental account for each decision. In the stock 
market context, investors subject to loss aversion would be reluctant, for example, to sell a stock with 
current price lower than the price they paid for that stock (which would be, in this case, the reference 
around which they frame their decisions). They would also feel riskier to continue holding a winning 
stock. Mental accounting prevents them from evaluating the best decision for their whole portfolio, 
leading them to evaluate stocks individually. Thus, DE investors sell winners and hold losers. Due to tax investors are subject to this behavioral bias. Frazzini (2006) studies investment funds 
and also finds evidence of disposition effect on the decisions of professional asset 
managers. These evidences support the idea that disposition effect may be involved in a 
large proportion of trades, being capable of limiting arbitrage as proposed by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), and thus playing a role in asset pricing.
21  
 
In the presence of investors subject to disposition effect (henceforth DE 
investors.), market is very liquid for winner stocks, because DE investors are inclined to 
sell their shares. Positive demand shocks (that is demand shocks that cause price 
increase) are easily absorbed at small price changes. The trust of our argument is that 
DE behavior is not symmetric for winner stocks and loser stocks. If DE investors are 
losing on a stock, they do not want to either sell or buy shares of that stock; they just 
want to hold their current position. The market is then more illiquid for a past loser, and 
we find the link between past returns and illiquidity, and thus conditional volatility, that 
we were looking for. 
 
The problem with the argument above is that for winner stocks we should expect 
DE investors to be more prone to sell their shares. The market for the stock would be 
then less illiquid, and conditional volatility should react less to demand shocks. This 
means that the sign of coefficient θ3 in equation (3) should be negative, but in Table II 
this sign is ambiguous. 
 
Core to the direction of the disposition effect (i.e. to the choice of selling quickly 
or holding the stock) is the reference from which DE investors frame the problem. 
Because DE investors are averse to losses, they want to sell a share if its current price is 
above the price they paid for it, and hold it if the current price is below. The difference 
between current and paid prices is the capital gain. The cumulative past return is a proxy 
for the capital gain.
22 The cumulative return over the 10 preceding days used in Section 
3, to follow Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006a), is a rough proxy of capital gain. 
Griblatt and Han (2005), studying the relation between disposition effect and 
momentum, propose taking a weighed average of a long sequence of past prices. We 
take 250 days (approximately 1 year) backwards.
23 The weights are proxies for the 
quantity of shares that DE investors bought on date t–k, and still hold on date t, 
normalized so that the sum of weights equals one. Following this procedure, capital 
gain, labeled gt, is computed as: 
                                                                                                                                             
benefits (the possibility of deducing realized losses from earnings), fully rational investors should at least 
combine the selling of winners and losers to minimize taxes, after adjusting for transaction costs. (See 
Shefrin and Statman, 1985). 
 
21 Indeed, Grinblatt and Han (2005) develop an equilibrium model considering disposition effect that 
explains “momentum” (the tendency of past winners to continue presenting higher returns, and past losers 
to continue presenting lower returns, first reported by Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). They also provide 
empirical evidence supporting their proposition. 
 
22 Note that because dividends are not considered, capital gain over a period is usually not the same as the 
return. Additionally, the capital gain depends on the price paid, and not only on the recent returns. If the 
shares were bought too long ago, even after positive cumulative returns in the recent past, capital gain 
may be negative, depending on the whole history of returns since the purchasing day. 
 
23 Grinblatt and Han (2005) used 250 weeks (approximately 5 years). Using stocks with 5 years of data 
before 1988 would reduce too much our sample. Using 250 days makes the difference to taking the ten 10 
past days, without reducing the sample.  
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where Vj,t is the turnover of stock j on date t, computed as the ratio of total shares traded 
on that day, by outstanding shares on that day, and r
*
j,t–k is the ex-dividend return of 
stock j on date t.
24 
 
Table III presents the estimated parameters in equation (3), when dummies I
ss
j,t 
are determined based on the signs of the capital gain gj,t instead of the cumulative return 
over the past ten days. The main difference between Table II and Table III is that in the 
later the sign of θ3 is not ambiguous anymore. Indeed, as expected from our argument, it 
is negative, and statistically significant at 10% level for all size groups, and at 5% level 
for four of the five size groups. 
 
 
Table III –  Estimated parameters of equation (3), using Grinblatt and Han’s (1985) 



















































































2  9,38%  11,49%  13,29%  14,4%  19,5% 
                                                 
24 Grinblatt and Han (2005) take the nominal prices at which stocks were actually traded. We believe this 
is not the best approach because there may be splits and grouping of shares that affect prices, but probably 
are adjusted in the reference price. It is important to remember that as in Griblatt and Han (2005), and 
consistent with empirical evidence from Odean (1998), investors subject to disposition effect are 
informed, and their demand function partly incorporates the demand function of arbitrageurs. Instead of 
using nominal trading prices, we use returns corrected for splits and groupings, but not adjusted for 
dividends. This way we capture the actual capital gain per share.  
5. Conclusion 
 
We presented empirical evidence that the intensity of asymmetric volatility effect 
depends on the sign of past cumulative returns. The greater partial correlation between 
volatility and return, in absolute value, occurs when the cumulative return in the past ten 
days and current return are both negative. 
 
We explained this result as a consequence of the behavioral bias labeled disposition 
effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985). We argue that investors subject to disposition 
effect are more willing to sell winner stocks (those that provide capital gain), and more 
prone to hold their loser stocks (those that provide capital loss). The market is then 
illiquid for losers (stocks with negative cumulative returns), increasing the magnitude of 
price changes in the presence of demand shocks. 
 
Grinblatt and Han (2005) proposes a procedure to estimate capital gain, and thus to 
evaluate whether investors subject to disposition effect are more willing to sell or to 
hold their shares. Using this procedure, we show that not only volatility increases more 
in the presence of capital loss and negative current return, but also, as expected from our 
explanation, that volatility increases less in the presence of positive capital gain and 






Andersen, T., Bollerslev. T., 1998. “Answering the skeptics: Yes, standard volatility 
models do provide accurate forecasts”,  International Economic Review, 39 (4), 885–
905. 
 
Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Goyal, A., 2006a, “The impact of trades on daily volatility”, 
Review of Financial Studies 19 (4), 1241-1277. 
 
Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Goyal, A., 2006b, “Liquidity and Autocorrelations in 
Individual Stock Returns”, Journal of Finance 61 (5), 2365-2394. 
 
Bolerslev, T., 1986, “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity”, 
Journal of Econometrics 31, 307-327. 
 
Campbell, J. Y., Grossman, S. J., Wang, J., 1993, "Trading  Volume  and  Serial  
Correlation  in Stock Returns," Quarterly  Journal of Economics 108, 905-939. 
 
Corsi, F., 2009, “A simple aspproximate long-memory model of realized volatility”, 
Journal of Financial Econometrics, 7 (2), 174–196. 
 
DeLong, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., Waldmann, R. J., 1990, “Noise trader risk 
in financial market”, Journal of Political Economy 98 (4), 703-738. 
 
Enders, W., 2004, Applied Econometric Time Series (2
nd edition), Wiley. 
 Engle, R. F., 1982, “Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the 
variance of U.K. inflation”, Econometrica 50, 987-1008. 
 
Frazzini, A., 2006, “The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News”, Journal of 
Finance 61 (4), 2017-2046. 
 
French, K. R., and R. Roll, 1986, “Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information 
and the Reaction of Traders”, Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5–26. 
 
Glosten, L. R., Milgrom, P. R., 1985, “Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist 
market with heterogeneously informed traders”, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 
71-100. 
 
Grinblatt, M., Han, B., 2005, “Prospect theory, mental accounting, and momentum”, 
Journal of Financial Economics 78, 311–339. 
 
Grossman, S. J., Stiglitz, J. E., 1980, “On the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets”, American Economic Review, 70 (3), 393-408. 
 
Jegadeesh, N. Titman, S., 1993, “Returns to buying winners and selling losers: 
Implications for stock market efficiency”, Journal of Finance 48 (1), 65-91. 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979, “Prospect Theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk”, Econometrica 47, 263-291. 
 
Kyle, A. S., 1985, “Continuous auction and insider trading”, Econometrica 53 (6), 
1315-1336. 
 
Llorente, G., Michaely, R., Saar, G., Wang, J., 2002, “Dynamic volume-return relation 
of individual stocks”, Review of Financial Studies 15 (4), 1005-1047. 
 
Lo, A. W., MacKinlay, A. C., 1988, “”Stock market prices do not follow random walks: 
evidence from a simple specification test”, Review of Financial Studies 1 (1), 41-66. 
 
Nelson, D. B., 1991, “Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new approach”, 
Econometrica 59 (2), 347-370. 
 
Odean, T., 1998, “Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?”, Journal of Finance 
53 (5), 1775-1798. 
 
Poon, S., Granger, C. W. J., 2003, “Forecasting volatility in financial markets: a 
review”, Journal of Economic Literature 41, 478-539. 
 
Roll, R., 1988, “R2”, Journal of Finance 43, 541–566. 
 
Ross, S. A., 1989, “Information and volatility: The no-arbitrage martingale approach to 
timing and resolution irrelevancy”, Journal of Finance 44 (1), 1-17. 
 
Schwert, G. W., 1990, “Stock volatility and the crash of ’87”, Review of Financial 
Studies 3, 77–102.  
Shefrin,H, Statman,M.,1985, “The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers 
too long: theory and evidence”, Journal of Finance 40, 777–790. 
 
Shiller, R., 1981, “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified By Subsequent 
Changes in Dividends?”, American Economic Review 71, 421–436. 
 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., W., 1997, “The limits of arbitrage”, Journal of Finance 52 (1), 
35–55. 
 
Schwert, G. W., 2003, “Anomalies and market efficiency” in Handbook of Economics 
and Finance (Edited by G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz), Amsterdam, 
North-Holland. 
 
Thaler, R., 1980, “Toward a positive theory of consumer choice”, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 1, 39–60. 
 
Wang, J.,  1994,  "A model  of  competitive stock trading volume,"  Journal of Political 
Economy 102, 127-168. 
 
West, K. D., 1988, “Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility”, Econometrica 56 
(1), 37-61. 
 